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State v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co.: Louisiana 
Revised Statutes Section 30:29 and Its Effect on the 
Amount of Remediation Damages Available to 
Plaintiffs 
INTRODUCTION 
Within the past decade, Louisiana has witnessed a surge in land 
contamination litigation, particularly in regards to oil and gas 
exploration sites.1 These types of cases are commonly referred to 
as “legacy litigation.”2 In a typical legacy litigation case, a 
landowner discovers damage to his land that was caused by either 
a mineral lease on the property or by some other kind of toxic 
exposure.3 The landowner naturally wants to hold someone 
responsible for the damage, and consequently the legacy litigation 
begins. 
The Louisiana Legislature first stepped into the legacy 
litigation debate in 2005.4 Recognizing the negative environmental 
implications of land contamination, the Legislature passed a statute 
that encourages property cleanup.5 Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 30:29 requires that any damages awarded to a plaintiff for 
“the evaluation or remediation of environmental damage” must be 
paid into the registry of the court, rather than directly to the 
plaintiff.6 This requirement reduces the chance that a plaintiff will 
keep the money for personal use instead of using it for the reason it 
was awarded. 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2014, by JULIA L. TAYLOR. 
 1. See Loulan Pitre, Jr., Six Years Later: Louisiana Legacy Lawsuits Since 
Act 312, 1 LSU J. ENERGY L. & RES. 93, 94 (2012) [hereinafter Pitre, Six Years 
Later]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. In some circumstances, it is difficult to determine whether the landowner 
caused the damage or if it was the fault of a lessee. See Jim Magill, Louisiana 
Ruling Keeps Chevron in Lawsuit, PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS (Feb. 5, 2013), 
http://www.terraconsultores.com/descargas/platts-oilgram-news.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8HXN-AES6. Although this Note does not discuss the hardship in 
determining who caused the damage, it is an interesting question that should 
perhaps be addressed by another article. 
 4. See Act No. 312, 2006 La. Acts 1472. 
 5. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(A) (Supp. 2014). 
 6. Id. § 30:29(D), (I)(1)–(2) (“‘Environmental damage’ shall mean any 
actual or potential impact, damage, or injury to environmental media caused by 
contamination resulting from activities associated with oilfield sites or 
exploration and production sites. Environmental media shall include but not be 
limited to soil, surface water, ground water, or sediment. ‘Evaluation or 
remediation’ shall include but not be limited to investigation, testing, 
monitoring, containment, prevention, or abatement.”). 
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Furthermore, the statute requires the Louisiana Department of 
Natural Resources (DNR) to play a direct role in determining the 
amount of remediation damages.7 The fact-finder first determines 
liability and damages, as is the case in typical litigation. After the 
fact-finder has determined damages, each party submits cleanup 
plans to DNR, which then adopts its own number—a number 
statutorily required under section 30:29 and based on the evidence 
submitted by the parties.8 This number is part of a comprehensive 
cleanup plan called “the most feasible plan.”9 The plan is then 
submitted back to the trial court, which oversees the distribution of 
the money and ensures that it is used to remediate the land.10 
Although section 30:29 was passed with the stated intent of 
protecting Louisiana’s resources, the language of the statute is 
dense and ambiguous.11 The Louisiana Supreme Court has dealt 
with the statute a few times, but each time it has failed to clarify it 
in a way that guarantees uniform interpretation among the lower 
courts.12 Most recently in State v. Louisiana Land & Exploration 
Co., the Louisiana Supreme Court grappled with section 30:29 in 
determining the total amount of damages available to a plaintiff.13 
The Court addressed the issue of how to allocate the difference 
between a fact-finder’s determination of remediation damages and 
DNR’s statutorily required determination of remediation damages 
when the fact-finder’s determination is higher.14 The majority in 
Louisiana Land held that judgments for environmental land 
damage are not limited to the cost of remediation as determined 
under the statute’s procedure.15 Rather, the majority held that a 
landowner is entitled to recover damages in excess of DNR’s 
determination as to the cost of remediation, even if the original 
contract between the plaintiff-landowner and the defendant-lessee 
                                                                                                             
 7. See id. § 30:29(C). 
 8. See id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See id. § 30:29(D)(2)–(4).  
 11. See id. § 30:29(A). 
 12. See infra Part I.D. 
 13. State v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 110 So. 3d 1038, 1040 (La. 2013). 
 14. See id. at 1054. The Court ultimately held that the landowner is entitled 
to excess remediation damages “[i]f a court awards remediation damages 
pursuant to an express contract provision that is a greater amount than that 
ordered to be placed into the court’s registry to fund the remediation plan . . . . 
Likewise, ‘any award’ for ‘additional remediation’ may be kept by the 
landowner, as well.” Id. 
 15. Id. at 1049 (“The procedure under the Act does not prohibit the award 
of remediation damages for more than the amount necessary to fund the 
statutorily mandated feasible plan, nor does the procedure described in the Act 
intrude into the manner in which remediation damages are determined.”). 
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did not expressly contract for restoration of the land.16 In other 
words, the fact-finder may determine that remediation damages 
should be higher than DNR’s determination of damages, with the 
excess award transferring directly to the plaintiff instead of to the 
court’s registry. 
This decision rested on the Court’s interpretation of section 
30:29. Although the majority and dissent strongly disagreed on the 
interpretation of the statute’s language, both argued that the statute 
was clear and unambiguous.17 However, with such diametrically 
opposed opinions on the proper statutory interpretation, this 
decision is a strong warning sign that the statute’s language is 
neither clear nor unambiguous. Given the difficulty in interpreting 
and applying section 30:29 and the frequency with which land 
contamination cases are litigated,18 this Note urges the Legislature 
to revise the statute in a way that more accurately reflects the 
Legislature’s intent to remediate land to the extent necessary to 
protect the public.19  
The Legislature must act more effectively to protect 
Louisiana’s environment. To that end, Part I of this Note provides 
background information on legacy litigation in Louisiana. In 
addition, Part I describes Louisiana’s current law of damages in 
detail, revealing the shortcomings of section 30:29 and the 
Louisiana Supreme Court’s various interpretations of the statute. 
Part II explores the Court’s most recent interpretation of the statute 
in State v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., discussing the facts, 
implications, and ensuing confusion of the decision. Part III 
analyzes Louisiana Land and its interpretations of section 30:29, 
parsing through its ambiguous language and stated legislative 
purpose. Finally, Part IV advocates that the Legislature revise the 
statute to more accurately reflect its original intent by explicitly 
recognizing that remediation damages in excess of DNR’s 
determination may be recovered, even in the absence of an express 
contractual provision providing for remediation damages. 
                                                                                                             
 16. Id. 
 17. See id. at 1063–64 (Victory, J., dissenting). 
 18. See, e.g., David E. Dismukes, The Impact of Legacy Lawsuits on 
Conventional Oil and Gas Drilling in Louisiana, LSU CTR. FOR ENERGY 
STUDIES, http://www.enrg.lsu.edu/files/images/presentations/2012/DISMUKES 
_LEGACY_RPT_02-28-12_FINAL.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/XB5L-
3NCV (last visited Sept. 29, 2014). In 2010, the number of active legacy 
litigation lawsuits was over 150. Id.  
 19. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(A) (Supp. 2014) (“It is the duty of the 
legislature to set forth procedures to ensure that damage to the environment is 
remediated to a standard that protects the public interest.”). 
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I. LEGACY LITIGATION AND ITS DIFFICULTIES 
By nature, legacy litigation cases usually present a myriad of 
problems.20 The tracts of land at the center of these disputes have 
often been subject to numerous mineral leases over the years,21 
making it difficult to identify the party or parties responsible for 
damages.22 Even when courts find a lessee responsible for the 
damage, they often struggle with how much money should be 
granted for remediation damages in the absence of an express 
contractual provision.23 Such remediation damages include the costs 
of “investigation, testing, monitoring, containment, prevention, or 
abatement” of the contaminated tract of land.24 Oftentimes the cost 
of repairing the land, or restoring it to the condition it was in before 
the lease was executed, is drastically more expensive than the value 
of the land itself.25 
A. Balancing Two Competing Public Policies 
Part of the struggle in determining remediation damages can be 
explained by two competing public policies: (1) courts want to 
award damages significant enough to deter defendants from 
engaging in risky, potentially environmentally damaging practices, 
but (2) courts do not want the plaintiff to receive a windfall.26 On 
the environmental side of the public policy coin, courts are very 
much aware that oilfield operations can have negative 
                                                                                                             
 20. See Pitre, Six Years Later, supra note 1, at 93. 
 21. The Louisiana Mineral Code defines a “mineral lease” as “a contract by 
which the lessee is granted the right to explore for and produce minerals.” LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:114 (2000). 
 22. Magill, supra note 3, at 11 (“In many cases, it is difficult for the 
landowners to identify the responsible party because of changes in company 
ownership and bankruptcies over the years.”). This Note does not discuss the 
potential for holding the wrong lessee accountable in legacy-type litigation 
cases, nor does it discuss the issue of prescription and notice.  
 23. See, e.g., State v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 110 So. 3d 1038 (La. 
2013) (illustrating two differing views held by the majority and dissenting 
opinions on the amount of remediation damages). 
 24. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(I)(2) (Supp. 2014). 
 25. Pitre, Six Years Later, supra note 1, at 95 (“In Corbello, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court held that in a claim for breach of a contractual obligation to 
restore property, damages need not be ‘tethered’ to the value of the property, 
thus allowing landowners to assert and receive damages that disregarded, and 
largely exceeded, the fair market worth of the property.”). See also Corbello v. 
Iowa Prod., 850 So. 2d 686, 692–93 (La. 2003). The Court in Corbello awarded 
$33 million in restoration damages, despite the fact that the land was valued at a 
mere $108,000. Corbello, 850 So. 2d at 692–93. 
 26. See Corbello, 850 So. 2d at 701. 
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environmental impacts.27 One common fear is that oil and other 
toxins will leak into groundwater, thus tainting the already scarce 
water supply.28 This gives cause for concern particularly in 
Louisiana, where “oilfield operations are a leading cause of 
groundwater contamination.”29 
However, courts must balance this environmental concern with 
the other side of the public policy coin—preventing plaintiffs from 
receiving a windfall. Courts must also consider the possibility that 
plaintiffs might not use damage awards to clean up their land.30 In 
awarding large damages, the courts are in effect attempting to 
remediate a public harm through a private forum.31 Thus, since 
environmental contamination can affect the public, remediation 
awards should arguably be utilized in a way that protects the 
public. Thus, the Louisiana Legislature and courts have struggled 
over the years with effectively balancing these two countervailing 
public policy concerns. 
                                                                                                             
 27. See id.; J. Michael Veron, Oilfield Contamination Litigation in 
Louisiana: Property Rights on Trial, 25 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 3 (2011).  
 28. Veron, supra note 27, at 3. 
 29. Id. Furthermore, the process of drilling and extracting oil alone requires 
an enormous volume of water. What Goes In and Out of Hydraulic Fracturing, 
DANGERS OF FRACKING, http://www.dangersoffracking.com/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/4LTK-5TAF (last visited Sept. 9, 2014). Each time a well is 
“fracked” (as a result of hydraulic fracturing), drillers use up to eight million 
gallons of water. Id. A well can be fracked up to eighteen times, so each well 
over the course of its life can use up to 144 million gallons of water. Id. 
Fracking has become increasingly popular in Louisiana, and in light of the fact 
that only 0.003% of the world’s water is now drinkable, the amount of water that 
is used in these oil and gas operations can be particularly worrisome. Louisiana 
and Fracking, EARTHJUSTICE, http://earthjustice.org/features/campaigns/lou 
isiana-and-fracking, archived at http://perma.cc/GWG9-2CP9 (last visited Sept. 
9, 2014); Veron, supra note 27, at 2. Couple that concern with the potential for 
drilling operations to cause contamination in underground water aquifers, and it 
is clear that oil and gas production presents daunting environmental dangers. 
Veron, supra note 27, at 3. 
 30. See Loulan Pitre, Jr., “Legacy Litigation” and Act 312 of 2006, 20 TUL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 347, 348 (2007) [hereinafter Pitre, Legacy Litigation]. Prior to the 
enactment of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:29, “[t]he landowner could 
sue for, and potentially collect, damages greatly in excess of the uncontaminated 
value of the property and then have no legal obligation to spend that money to 
remediate the property.” Id. 
 31. Loyd J. Bourgeois, Comment, Private Actions Seeking Remediation or 
Restoration Damages: Who Ensures the Cleanup Actually Occurs?, 17 TUL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 355, 359 (2004) (“Thus, while the private law actions currently used to 
recover damages are based on the traditional belief that the recovery is for ex post 
harm to an individual’s property, a public law goal of protection and prevention 
from environmental harm may be served by severing the distinction between public 
and private law and recognizing that environmental contamination of private land 
affects both private individuals and the public at large.”). 
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B. The Louisiana Supreme Court’s Traditional Approach to the 
Legacy Litigation Problem 
Historically, Louisiana courts have applied traditional breach-of-
contract principles to legacy litigation cases.32 In Louisiana’s 
civilian tradition, specific performance is the preferred remedy for the 
failure to perform an obligation.33 This preference arises out of the 
belief that specific performance provides “the best satisfaction”—it 
awards the interest that the parties were entitled to expect.34 Specific 
performance has dual effects: it restores the obligee to its original 
position but avoids the imposition of an undue burden on the 
obligor.35 However, the avoidance of an undue burden on the 
obligor “ignore[s] the cost of environmental remediation ultimately 
borne by the private landowner” and ignores the public aspect of 
the harm.36 
Today, the remedy of damages is treated differently in land 
contamination cases depending on whether the action is a tort or a 
                                                                                                             
 32. Although the Mineral Code covers mineral leases, it does not provide 
guidance in determining remediation damages due to environmental contamination. 
Mineral Code article 122 outlines the lessee’s obligations to the lessor but does not 
consider damages:  
A mineral lessee is not under a fiduciary obligation to his lessor, but he 
is bound to perform the contract in good faith and to develop and 
operate the property leased as a reasonably prudent operator for the 
mutual benefit of himself and his lessor. Parties may stipulate what 
shall constitute reasonably prudent conduct on the part of the lessee. 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:122 (2009).  
 33. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1986 (2012) (“Upon an obligor’s failure to 
perform an obligation to deliver a thing, or not to do an act, or to execute an 
instrument, the court shall grant specific performance plus damages for delay if 
the obligee so demands. If specific performance is impracticable, the court may 
allow damages to the obligee. Upon a failure to perform an obligation that has 
another object, such as an obligation to do, the granting of specific performance 
is at the discretion of the court.”); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315 (2012) 
(“Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by 
whose fault it happened to repair it.”); SAUL LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 1.7, in 
5 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 15 (1992) (The law of obligations allows an 
obligee “to demand the specific performance of the obligation.”). However, 
when specific performance is impractical, the court may allow damages in lieu 
of specific performance. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1986 (2012). 
 34. LITVINOFF, supra note 33, § 1.7, at 15. 
 35. See Mary Beth Balhoff, Corbello v. Iowa Production and the 
Implications of Restoration Damages in Louisiana: Drilling Holes in Deep 
Pockets for Thirty-Three Million Dollars, 65 LA. L. REV. 271, 277 (2004); see 
also Brian Lindsey, Comment, Shady Grove on the Bayou: Louisiana’s 
Procedural Limitations on Legacy Oil Suits in a post-Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co. Landscape, 2 LSU J. ENERGY L. & RES. 
173, 174 (2013).  
 36. Lindsey, supra note 35, at 174. 
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breach of contract.37 The Louisiana Supreme Court held in Roman 
Catholic Church v. Louisiana Gas Service Co., a tort case 
involving land contamination, that when the cost of restoration 
exceeds the fair market value of the property, the award should 
typically be tethered to the fair market value of the property.38 In 
other words, full restoration is not required in tort cases when the 
damage is greater than the value of the property. The Court 
outlined two exceptions to the fair market value rule—lessees are 
liable for remediation damages instead of just the fair market value 
if: (1) the plaintiff has a personal tie to the land, or (2) there is 
reason to believe that the plaintiff will restore the property to its 
original condition.39 
Following the Roman Catholic rationale, many in the oil 
industry believed that contract damages would be similar to the 
remedies available in tort cases—that “damages would equal the 
value of the thing, not the cost to rebuild or restore the thing”—in 
land contamination cases.40 However, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court has held that in breach-of-contract cases involving land 
contamination, damages are not necessarily limited to the fair 
market value of the land.41 Corbello v. Iowa Production, a 2003 
Louisiana Supreme Court decision, opened the door to larger 
damage awards by holding that landowners could recover the cost 
of restoration of the land rather than just the fair market value of 
the property.42 
In Corbello, the cost of restoring the plaintiff’s land to its prior 
condition was 300 times the fair market value of the land.43 Still, 
the Court respected the “four corners of the contract,” holding that 
since the original lease expressly stated that the lessee would 
                                                                                                             
 37. See Roman Catholic Church v. La. Gas Serv. Co., 618 So. 2d 874, 879 
(La. 1993); cf. Corbello v. Iowa Prod., 850 So. 2d 686, 695 (La. 2003). 
 38. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 998 So. 2d 16, 38 (La. 2008) 
(Johnson, J., concurring). In Roman Catholic, the tortfeasors were a gas service 
company and its insurer. Thus, the dispute was between the landowner and the 
gas service company and its insurer. See Roman Catholic, 618 So. 2d at 875. In 
Corbello and the vast majority of land contamination cases, the dispute is 
between the landowner and a lessee. See 850 So. 2d at 691. 
 39. See Roman Catholic, 618 So. 2d at 879–80. 
 40. Balhoff, supra note 35, at 271.  
 41. Corbello, 850 So. 2d at 695 (“However, while we find it logical in tort 
cases to tether the amount of damages by balancing the amount to be paid by the 
negligent tortfeasor against the goal to restore the plaintiff, as closely as 
possible, to the position which he would have occupied had the accident never 
occurred, this same logic should not be extended to breach of contract cases.”). 
 42. Id. at 693. The court held that “the damage award for a breach of 
contractual obligation to reasonably restore property need not be tethered to the 
market value of the property.” Id. 
 43. Id. at 692. 
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restore the land at the end of the term, the lessee was strictly bound 
to such terms—regardless of the fact that the fair market value was 
a small fraction of the restoration cost.44 The Court further stated 
that had the defendant wished for the damages to be tethered to the 
fair market value of the land, it could have contracted for that 
provision in the original mineral lease.45 The Court suggested that 
limiting damages to the fair market value of the land, despite the 
contractual provision, would give free rein to oil companies in 
their operations “with indifference as to the aftermath of its 
operations because of the assurance that it would not be 
responsible for the full cost of restoration.”46 
The Corbello case demonstrates that, in land contamination 
cases, courts make distinctions between contract law and tort law 
in the area of damages.47 This distinction arises from the fact that 
in contract law, the parties can freely contract to limit damages.48 
If an oil company is concerned about the possibility of future 
litigation, then the company and the landowner can contract to 
limit damages to the fair market value of the land.49 Courts 
recognize that it is vital not to tether contract damages to the fair 
market value of the land because lessees otherwise have little 
incentive to treat property with care.50 In tort law, however, parties 
do not contract with each other on damages.51 Neither party 
consents to the action: the injured victim does not consent to the 
injury, and the tortfeasor does not consent to the remedy.52 Thus, 
the lack of consent perhaps explains why damages should be 
limited to fair market value in tort cases and why the opposite is 
true in breach-of-contract actions.53 
                                                                                                             
 44. Id. at 695. 
 45. Id. at 694. 
 46. Id. at 695. 
 47. Id. at 694–95.  
 48. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1906 (2012) (“A contract is an agreement by two 
or more parties whereby obligations are created, modified, or extinguished.”); 
see also Corbello, 850 So. 2d at 694–95 (“We find that the contractual terms of 
a contract, which convey the intentions of the parties, overrule any policy 
considerations behind such a rule limiting damages in tort cases.”). 
 49. See Corbello, 850 So. 2d at 694–95; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 1971 
(2012) (“Parties are free to contract for any object that is lawful, possible, and 
determined or determinable.”). 
 50. See Corbello, 850 So. 2d at 695. 
 51. See Hartwin Bungert, Compensating Harm to the Defective Product 
Itself—A Comparative Analysis of American and German Products Liability 
Law, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1179, 1199 (1992). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. (“Put simply, the basic conceptual difference between contract law 
and tort law lies in the consent and the lack of consent, respectively, of the party 
to the imposition of obligations. The notion that risks, in respect to the parties’ 
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C. The Legislature’s Response to Corbello v. Iowa Production Co. 
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court established in Corbello 
that contract damages are not tethered to the fair market value of 
the land, the Court expressed concern that large damages such as 
those awarded in Corbello could result in a windfall for plaintiffs, 
as there is no legal requirement on the part of plaintiffs to 
remediate their land with damage awards.54 In other words, 
landowners were being awarded private damages for public 
environmental harm, yet those landowners could keep the damages 
to the public’s detriment. The Corbello Court discussed the 
Legislature’s inaction and “seemed to invite consideration of a 
legislative reaction.”55 The Legislature accepted this invitation and 
passed Act 312 in 2006, now codified as Louisiana Revised 
Statutes section 30:29,56 “primarily in an effort to ensure that 
contaminated oil and gas exploration sites were remediated to the 
extent necessary to protect the public interest.”57 Thus, the 
Legislature’s goal was to protect Louisiana’s natural resources and 
the public, rather than limiting or restricting the amount of 
damages awardable to plaintiffs.58 
Section 30:29 states that “all damages or payments in any civil 
action . . . awarded for the evaluation or remediation of 
environmental damage shall be paid exclusively into the registry of 
the court.”59 Thus, a landowner seeking recovery for environmental 
                                                                                                             
 
economic expectations, should be allocated by private agreement and not 
imposed by strict law parallels this distinction between tort and contract.”). This 
Note does not delve into the possibility of expanding beyond the fair market 
value of property in tort cases involving land contamination. 
 54. See Corbello, 850 So. 2d at 700 (“Since no court can order the plaintiffs 
in this case to expend the award on decontaminating the property, the outcome 
allowed by the trial court does nothing to protect the citizens of Mississippi from 
the dangers of . . . contamination.”).  
 55. Pitre, Legacy Litigation, supra note 30, at 348 (claiming that the 
decision allows for contaminated property to be the equivalent of winning a 
lottery ticket for the landowner). 
 56. Act No. 312, 2006 La. Acts 1472. 
 57. Pitre, Six Years Later, supra note 1, at 94.  
 58. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(A) (Supp. 2014) (“It is the duty of the 
legislature to set forth procedures to ensure that damage to the environment is 
remediated to a standard that protects the public interest.” (emphasis added)).  
 59. Id. § 30:29(D)(1). The full text of section 30:29(D) is provided below.  
(1) Whether or not the department or the attorney general intervenes, 
and except as provided in Subsection H of this Section, all damages or 
payments in any civil action, including interest thereon, awarded for the 
evaluation or remediation of environmental damage shall be paid 
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damages must pursue a determination of the remediation damages 
from DNR.60 This determination is made after the trial court stage. 
After a determination is made, the trial court must adopt DNR’s 
plan, unless one of the parties proves by a preponderance of the 
evidence that an alternate plan is more feasible to achieve the 
Legislature’s goals.61 Once the court adopts a plan, the damages 
awarded to remediate the land to regulatory standards are paid into 
the registry of the court, and the court then controls and oversees 
the remediation process.62 The statute does not prevent a 
                                                                                                             
 
exclusively into the registry of the court in an interest-bearing account 
with the interest accruing to the account for clean up. 
(2) The court may allow any funds to be paid into the registry of the 
court to be paid in increments as necessary to fund the evaluation or 
remediation and implementation of any plan or submittal adopted by 
the court. In any instance in which the court allows the funds to be paid 
in increments, whether or not an appeal is taken, the court shall require 
the posting of a bond for the implementation of the plan in such amount 
as provided by and in accordance with the procedures set forth for the 
posting of suspensive appeal bonds. Any such bond shall be valid 
through completion of the remediation. 
(3) The court shall issue such orders as may be necessary to ensure that 
any such funds are actually expended in a manner consistent with the 
adopted plan for the evaluation or remediation of the environmental 
damage for which the award or payment is made. 
(4) The court shall retain jurisdiction over the funds deposited and the 
party or parties admitting responsibility or the party or parties found 
legally responsible by the court until such time as the evaluation or 
remediation is completed. If the court finds the amount of the initial 
deposit insufficient to complete the evaluation or remediation, the court 
shall, on the motion of any party or on its own motion, order the party 
or parties admitting responsibility or found legally responsible by the 
court to deposit additional funds into the registry of the court. Upon 
completion of the evaluation or remediation, the court shall order any 
funds remaining in the registry of the court to be returned to the 
depositor. The department and the parties shall notify the court of the 
completion of any evaluation or remediation. 
 60. See id. § 30:29(B)(1) (“Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, 
immediately upon the filing or amendment of any litigation or pleading making 
a judicial demand arising from or alleging environmental damage, the provisions 
of this Section shall apply and the party filing same shall provide timely notice 
to the state of Louisiana through the Department of Natural Resources, 
commissioner of conservation and the attorney general.”). 
 61. See id. § 30:29(C)(5) (“The court shall adopt the plan approved by the 
department, unless a party proves by a preponderance of the evidence that 
another plan is a more feasible plan to adequately protect the environment and 
the public health, safety, and welfare.”).  
 62. There are six major components of Act 312, summarized by the 
Louisiana Supreme Court:  
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landowner from pursuing judicial remedies for private awards, nor 
does it “preclude a judgment ordering damages for or 
implementation of additional remediation in excess of the 
requirements of the plan adopted by the court.”63 
The procedure under the statute is not intended to affect normal 
trial procedure.64 The fact-finder still has the responsibility of 
allocating liability and determining damages.65 However, if either a 
defendant admits liability prior to trial or the fact-finder finds the 
defendant liable, then the defendant must submit a cleanup plan to 
DNR.66 This occurs after the trial stage, and thus the trial court has 
already determined an appropriate amount of damages. The 
submitted plans are then presented before a public hearing, and 
DNR determines which is “the most feasible plan to accomplish 
the evaluation/remediation of the environmental damage while 
protecting the health, safety and welfare of the public.”67 DNR 
makes its determination based on applicable regulatory standards 
but is not limited “to any one standard in its development of the 
                                                                                                             
 
First, the act requires timely notice of such litigation to the State. 
Second, the act stays the litigation until thirty days after notice is given. 
Third, the act permits the State to intervene in the litigation. Fourth, the 
act provides a role for the Office of Conservation with the Louisiana 
Department of Natural Resources (“LDNR”) in the determination of the 
most feasible plan for evaluation and/or remediation of environmental 
damage. Fifth, the act provides for the payment of all damages for the 
evaluation or remediation of environmental damages and further 
provides that the Court shall oversee actual implementation of the plan 
adjudicated to be “most feasible.” Sixth, the act allows the landowner 
and the State to recover attorney and expert fees, as well as costs from 
the responsible party or parties. 
M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 998 So. 2d 16, 36 (La. 2008) (citations 
omitted). 
 63. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(H) (Supp. 2014). 
 64. State v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 110 So. 3d 1038, 1051 (La. 2013).  
 65. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(H) (Supp. 2014). 
 66. Id. § 30:29(C). Even when the defendant is required to submit a cleanup 
plan, any other party is also entitled to submit a plan. Id. 
 67. Louisiana Land, 110 So. 3d at 1052. Section 30:29(I)(3) defines the 
most feasible plan. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(I)(3) (Supp. 2014) 
(“‘Feasible Plan’ means the most reasonable plan which addresses 
environmental damage in conformity with the requirements of Louisiana 
Constitution Article IX, Section 1 to protect the environment, public health, 
safety and welfare, and is in compliance with the specific relevant and 
applicable standards and regulations promulgated by a state agency in 
accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act in effect at the time of clean 
up to remediate contamination resulting from oilfield or exploration and 
production operations or waste.”).  
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most feasible plan.”68 The trial court then has the ultimate 
responsibility of enforcing the most feasible plan and overseeing 
the remediation process.69 
D. Legacy Litigation after Corbello 
Following the enactment of section 30:29, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court grappled with the statute in three cases. In 
Terrebonne Parish School Board v. Castex Energy, Inc., decided 
in 2005, the Court found that Mineral Code article 122’s 
“reasonably prudent operator” standard does not necessarily 
require restoration of the land; rather, restoration may only be 
required when the lessee has acted unreasonably or excessively in 
using the land, absent an express provision in the lease for 
damages.70 Although full restoration is not necessarily required 
when a lessee acts unreasonably or excessively, the lessee must 
perform additional obligations in those circumstances.71 The 
“additional obligations” depend on the specific rights granted in 
the lease and the damage caused by the unreasonable or excessive 
                                                                                                             
 68. Louisiana Land, 110 So. 3d at 1052. Section 30:29(C)(3)(a) provides: 
“The department shall use and apply the applicable regulatory standards in 
approving or structuring a plan that the department determines to be the most 
feasible plan to evaluate or remediate the environmental damage.” LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 30:29(C)(3)(a) (Supp. 2014). Regulatory standards are determined 
pursuant to Statewide Order No. 29-B. See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. 1, §§ 
101–641 (2010). 
 69. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(D) (Supp. 2014). 
 70. Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Castex Energy, Inc., 893 So. 2d 789, 801 
(La. 2005). In this case, the lease was silent on the issue of restoration, and thus 
the Court had to grapple with the meaning of “a reasonably prudent operator.” 
Mineral Code article 122 requires a lessee to act as a “reasonably prudent 
operator,” but the issue was whether such a requirement entails full restoration. 
Absent unreasonableness or excessiveness, full restoration is not required under 
article 122. See Ross Roubion, Remediation Damages after State v. Louisiana 
Land & Exploration Company, LSU J. ENERGY L. & RES. CURRENTS (May 13, 
2013), http://sites.law.lsu.edu/jelrblog/?p=240, archived at http://perma.cc/SE5 
T-QLSH; see also Pitre, Legacy Litigation, supra note 30, at 349 (“[I]n the 
absence of an express contractual restoration obligation, the Louisiana Mineral 
Code did not create an implied duty of a mineral lessee to restore the surface 
after the ‘ordinary, customary, and reasonable acts’ done for drilling or 
exploration, unless caused by ‘unreasonable or negligent operations.’” (quoting 
Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd., 893 So. 2d at 798–801)).  
 71. See Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd., 893 So. 2d at 797; see also Marin v. 
Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234, 260 (La. 2010) (“Where the lessee has 
operated unreasonably or excessively, as in this case, the lessee has additional 
obligations, e.g., the obligation to correct the damage due to the unreasonable or 
excessive operations. However, that does not necessarily mean that the lessee 
has a duty to restore the land to its pre-lease condition . . . .”). 
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behavior.72 The Court also considered the meaning of “normal 
wear and tear,” noting the principle “that a lessor may not compel a 
lessee to restore the leased premises to their former condition when 
the lessor has expressly approved the modifications that the lessee 
accomplished.”73 Accordingly, when a lessor consents to certain acts 
of a lessee, it is likely that the lessee has not acted unreasonably or 
excessively in performing those acts and subsequently does not have 
to restore the land to its prior condition. 
A few years later in 2008, the Louisiana Supreme Court in M.J. 
Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp. held that section 30:29 applies 
retroactively, as it is procedural in nature and supplemental to any 
private claims.74 The Court held that “Act 312 [the Act that created 
section 30:29] supplements the Mineral Code” and merely “adopts 
a procedure and simply seeks to ensure that the property that is 
environmentally damaged is actually remediated.”75 Therefore, 
section 30:29 merely supplements the Mineral Code, and “[n]o 
conflict exists between the Mineral Code and the provisions of Act 
312.”76 
In 2010, the Court ruled in Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp. that 
the amount of restoration owed to a landowner is equal to the 
amount determined by DNR, as required in section 30:29.77 Thus, 
compensatory damages equaled statewide regulatory standards 
rather than the cost of restoring the land to its pre-leased 
                                                                                                             
 72. See Marin, 48 So. 3d at 260 (citing Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd., 893 So. 
2d at 800) (explaining what the phrase “additional obligations” means). 
 73. Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd., 893 So. 2d at 800.  
 74. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 998 So. 2d 16, 21–22 (La. 
2008). Act 312 became effective in June 2006, but it applied to cases in which 
the court had not issued or signed an order setting a trial date prior to March 27, 
2006. Id. at 21. The plaintiffs filed suit prior to March 27, 2006, but the date for 
trial had not yet been set. Id. The plaintiffs argued that Act 312 was 
unconstitutional because “its cause of action vested at the time the suit was filed 
and subsequent legislation cannot retroactively divest it of its cause of action.” 
Id. at 22. 
 75. Id. at 28, 36. 
 76. Id. at 28. 
 77. See Marin, 48 So. 3d at 261–62. The Court noted that it did not appear 
logical to “award the landowner money to remediate unusable groundwater, 
with no oversight by the DNR, when the statute enacted to classify and protect 
groundwater does not require a cleanup. Further, it is unclear from the record 
what additional damage this contaminated groundwater caused, beyond what 
was caused by the contaminated soil.” Id. The Louisiana Supreme Court held 
that although the lessee, Exxon, acted unreasonably and without the landowner’s 
consent, the lessee was not required to remediate the land when such 
remediation would not improve the unusable groundwater supply and when the 
damages are unclear. Id. 
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condition.78 The lessee in this case did act unreasonably and 
excessively, and the court found that the lessee’s additional 
obligation was a “duty to correct the contamination,” not the cost of 
restoration.79 
Those three decisions left the lower courts with three new 
rules: (1) absent an express provision, restoration is only required 
when a lessee acts unreasonably or excessively;80 (2) Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 30:29 is procedural and supplements 
private claims;81 and (3) compensatory damages equal DNR’s 
determination of regulatory standards, rather than full remediation.82 
In 2013, the Louisiana Supreme Court built upon these rules in 
deciding State v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co.  
II. STATE V. LOUISIANA LAND & EXPLORATION CO. 
Prior to Louisiana Land, it was clear that the “four corners of 
the contract” would be respected, meaning that if the parties to the 
lease specifically contracted for the lessee to restore the land to its 
original condition upon expiration of the lease, then the lessor 
could recover the full restoration value of the land.83 However, it 
was unclear whether the lessor could recover full restoration costs, 
if that amount was greater than the amount determined by DNR as 
required by section 30:29, when the lease did not contain an 
express contractual provision providing for remediation. The 
Louisiana Supreme Court in Louisiana Land addressed this 
question. 
The Court in Louisiana Land held that even when a landowner 
and lessee do not expressly contract that the lessee will restore the 
land to its prior condition, the lessee can still be required to 
remediate the land, despite the fact that the cost of restoring the 
land may be considerably more expensive than the value of the 
land itself.84 The Court further held that a plaintiff’s remediation 
damages are not limited to those determined under section 30:29; 
                                                                                                             
 78. Id. at 262 (“The trial court’s award of the amount necessary to restore 
the land to regulatory standards, rather than to its original condition, is 
appropriate.”).  
 79. Id. at 259–60. 
 80. Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Castex Energy, Inc., 893 So. 2d 789, 801 
(La. 2005).  
 81. M.J. Farms, 998 So. 2d at 21–22. 
 82. Marin, 48 So. 3d at 262. 
 83. Corbello v. Iowa Prod., 850 So. 2d 686, 695 (La. 2003). 
 84. See State v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 110 So. 3d 1038, 1054 (La. 
2013); see, e.g., Corbello, 850 So. 2d at 692 (awarding damages exceeding 
property value by more than 300 times). 
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in other words, the Court explained that a plaintiff can recover 
damages in excess of the amount determined by DNR.85 It is 
important to note that the Court did not say that the plaintiff should 
receive excess damages; rather, the Court merely held that the 
plaintiff should not be barred from pursuing excess damages.86 In 
other words, the Court left open the possibility of the fact-finder 
awarding more damages than those determined under DNR’s most 
feasible plan.  
A. Factual and Procedural Background 
In 2004, the Vermillion Parish School Board and the State of 
Louisiana filed a “Petition for Damages to School Lands,” seeking 
to recover remediation and damages from Louisiana Land & 
Exploration Company.87 The plaintiffs alleged that oil and gas 
operations polluted a tract of land located in Vermillion Parish and 
damaged the land’s soil, surface waters, and ground waters.88 
Specifically, the plaintiffs sought to recover under several theories 
of action, including negligence, strict liability, unjust enrichment, 
trespass, breach of contract, and various Mineral Code and Civil 
Code violations.89 
The plaintiffs alleged that the pollution was considered “to be 
extensive and to be a threat to the fish, wildlife, and the safety of the 
seafood supply in the White Lake area,” a Wetland Conservation 
area in Vermillion Parish consisting of approximately 108 square 
miles.90 The land at issue had been subject to two oil, gas, and 
mineral leases, one granted in 1935 and the other in 1994.91 The 
1994 surface lease contained an express contractual provision 
concerning remediation, and thus the courts did not interfere with 
                                                                                                             
 85. See Louisiana Land, 110 So. 3d. at 1054; Pitre, Six Years Later, supra 
note 1, at 95. 
 86. See Louisiana Land, 110 So. 3d at 1054 (“If a court awards remediation 
damages pursuant to an express contract provision that is a greater amount than 
that ordered to be placed into the court’s registry to fund the remediation plan, 
then the landowner is entitled to those ‘excess’ remediation damages.”).  
 87. Id. at 1040. 
 88. Id. The Vermillion Parish School Board managed the tract of land, 
while the State owned it. Id. 
 89. Id. at 1040–41. 
 90. State v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 85 So. 3d 158, 159 (La. Ct. App. 
2012) (appellate court decision); White Lake Wetlands Conservations Area, STATE 
OF LA: DEP’T OF WILDLIFE AND FISHERIES (Jan. 23, 2014, 11:14 AM), http://www 
.wlf.louisiana.gov/refuge/white-lake-wetlands-conservations-area, archived at http: 
//perma.cc/8QSL-SAYV. 
 91. See Louisiana Land, 110 So. 3d at 1040. 
596 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75 
 
 
 
that contract.92 However, the 1935 lease did not contain an express 
provision concerning remediation.93 
During discovery, one of the defendants, Unocal, admitted 
responsibility for environmental damage under section 30:29(C).94 
Unocal sought to have the case referred to DNR, as required by the 
statute.95 Vermillion Parish objected, arguing that a fact-finder first 
needed to determine fault among all of the defendants and 
adjudicate their private claims before a referral to DNR.96 Both the 
trial and appellate courts agreed with the plaintiffs, concluding that 
“a reasonable time under the statute within which the trial court 
should order the Unocal defendants to submit a remediation plan to 
[DNR] would be some time after liability and damages issues have 
been resolved regarding all of the defendants.”97 
Because the court found that a fact-finder must hear the claims 
against Unocal first, the defendants next claimed that the plaintiffs 
had no right to damages in excess of those necessary to fund the 
remediation plan under DNR.98 Filing a motion for summary 
judgment, the defendants claimed that excess damages are only 
allowed under an express contractual provision providing for 
remediation or restoration, and because the 1935 lease did not 
contain an express contractual provision, the plaintiffs could not 
claim excess damages.99 The Louisiana Supreme Court granted 
                                                                                                             
 92. See id. at 1045 (“La. R.S. 30:29 specifically states its provisions shall 
not be construed to impede or limit provisions under private contracts which 
impose their own remediation obligations.”). 
 93. See id.  
 94. See id. at 1041; see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(C)(1) (Supp. 
2014) (“If at any time during the proceeding a party admits liability for 
environmental damage or the finder of fact determines that environmental 
damage exists and determines the party or parties who caused the damage or 
who are otherwise legally responsible therefor, the court shall order the party or 
parties who admit responsibility or whom the court finds legally responsible for 
the damage to develop a plan or submittal for the evaluation or remediation to 
applicable regulatory standards of the contamination that resulted in the 
environmental damage. . . . The department shall submit to the court a schedule 
of estimated costs for review of the plans or submittals of the parties by the 
department and the court shall require the party admitting responsibility or the 
party found legally responsible by the court to deposit in the registry of the court 
sufficient funds to pay the cost of the department’s review of the plans or 
submittals.”). 
 95. See Louisiana Land, 110 So. 3d at 1041. 
 96. See id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See id. at 1042. 
 99. Id. In the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, they also argued 
that Chevron U.S.A., Inc., should be dismissed from the suit. The trial court 
granted a partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissed 
Chevron. The appellate court reversed, citing that “there [was] a genuine issue 
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writs to review the summary judgment and “determine the correct 
interpretation of Act 312 [Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
30:29].”100 
B. The Majority Opinion—Excess Remediation Damages Are 
Possible 
The majority ultimately held that the plaintiffs could recover in 
excess of the remediation damages determined by DNR, even 
absent an express contractual provision.101 In so holding, the 
majority relied on the theory of implied obligations under Civil 
Code article 2683—that a lessee should “return the thing at the end 
of the lease in a condition that is the same as it was when the thing 
was delivered to him, except for normal wear and tear.”102 Thus, 
even though the original 1935 lease did not contain an express 
contractual provision for remediation, the lessee still had an 
implied obligation to repair or restore the thing.103 
The majority found the language of section 30:29 to be 
unambiguous, noting that the statute “ensures the damages 
awarded for remediation will be used only for remediation to the 
extent necessary to fund the statutorily required plan.”104 The 
Court interpreted the statute as procedural and not meant to 
“interfere with private rights.”105 Thus, per the Court, the amount 
of remediation determined under the most feasible plan does not 
limit a plaintiff’s right to seek damages in excess of that amount, 
nor does it affect the manner in which remediation damages are 
determined.106 Under the statute, the court merely acts as a 
                                                                                                             
 
of material fact as to whether Chevron U.S.A., Inc. is a successor in interest to 
Unocal.” Id. at 1043–44 (citing State v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 85 So. 3d 
158 (La. Ct. App. 2012)). The Louisiana Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the 
appellate court’s decision, thereby retaining Chevron U.S.A., Inc., as a 
defendant. Id. at 1059.  
 100. Id. at 1044. 
 101. Id. at 1054. 
 102. Id. at 1046, 1054; LA. CIV. CODE art. 2683(3) (2012) (instructing that 
absent an express contractual provision concerning remediation, one should 
apply the Civil Code articles on leases). 
 103. See Louisiana Land, 110 So. 3d at 1054. 
 104. Id. at 1049 (emphasis omitted). 
 105. Id. at 1049, 1053 (“The legislature has not, in this solely procedural 
statute, stripped landowners of any of their substantive rights. The statute 
repeatedly assures this.”).  
 106. Id. at 1049. The Louisiana Supreme Court describes the procedure of 
Louisiana Revised Statues section 30:29 as follows: “The only change accomplished 
by Act 312 is how the damages to remediate property are spent. Under Act 312, 
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“gatekeeper,” ensuring that the ultimate purpose of the Act—
“remediation of the property to the extent of the public’s 
interest”—is upheld.107 
While the defendants urged that section 30:29 limits 
remediation damages to those determined by DNR under section 
30:29(D)’s most feasible plan, the majority disagreed, finding that 
the defendants were reading section 30:29(D) in isolation.108 
According to the majority, when the statute is read as a whole, 
section 30:29(H) allows a plaintiff to recover in excess of the 
amount determined by DNR to fund the most feasible plan.109 The 
majority stated: “If the money judgment for remediation exceeds 
the amount necessary to fund the plan, the plaintiff is granted a 
personal judgment for the ‘excess’ remediation damages; plaintiff 
is also granted a personal judgment on his other non-remediation 
private claims.”110 For example, if the trial court first determines 
that remediation damages are $4 million, and DNR’s most feasible 
                                                                                                             
 
landowners do not receive that portion of the remediation damages award 
needed to fund the statutorily mandated feasible plan; these funds must be 
deposited into the registry of the court.” Id. However, the Third Circuit in Savoie 
v. Richard altered the way in which remediation damages are determined. See 
Savoie v. Richard, 137 So. 3d 78 (La. Ct. App. 2014). Rather than providing the 
jury with a form that indicated a single number for remediation, the judge in 
Savoie had the jury break down remediation damages into two categories: the 
amount needed to remediate to regulatory standards and the amount to remediate 
beyond regulatory standards. Id. at 81. By altering the jury verdict form, the 
court in Savoie violated the Louisiana Supreme Court’s explicit interpretation of 
La. R.S. 30:29: “no provision of the Act changes normal trial procedures.” See 
Louisiana Land, 110 So. 3d at 1051. 
 107. See Louisiana Land, 110 So. 3d at 1049. 
 108. For the text of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:29(D), see supra 
note 59. 
 109. See Louisiana Land, 110 So. 3d at 1054. The full text of section 
30:29(H) provides: 
This Section shall not preclude an owner of land from pursuing a 
judicial remedy or receiving a judicial award for private claims suffered 
as a result of environmental damage, except as otherwise provided in 
this Section. Nor shall it preclude a judgment ordering damages for or 
implementation of additional remediation in excess of the requirements 
of the plan adopted by the court pursuant to this Section as may be 
required in accordance with the terms of an express contractual 
provision. Any award granted in connection with the judgment for 
additional remediation is not required to be paid into the registry of the 
court. This Section shall not be interpreted to create any cause of action 
or to impose additional implied obligations under the mineral code or 
arising out of a mineral lease. 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(H) (Supp. 2014). 
 110. Louisiana Land, 110 So. 3d at 1054. 
2014] NOTE 599 
 
 
 
plan determines the remediation damages are $3 million, the 
plaintiff could recover the $1 million excess.111 Thus, the majority 
concluded that a plaintiff can recover in excess of the remediation 
damages determined under the procedure of the statute in two 
different ways: (1) an express contractual provision; or (2) an 
implied lease obligation if the lessee has exercised his rights 
excessively or unreasonably.112 Finding that an issue of genuine 
material fact existed, the Louisiana Land Court affirmed the 
appellate court’s holding that reversed the trial court’s grant of 
partial summary judgment in favor of the defendant.113 
C. The Concurrence 
Justice Guidry ultimately concurred with the majority’s 
reversal of the defendant’s partial summary judgment but 
questioned whether a plaintiff can recover excess damages absent 
an express contractual provision.114 He saw no distinction between 
the environmental remediation given to a plaintiff under the 
Mineral and Civil Codes and the compensatory award to fund the 
most feasible plan under section 30:29.115 He expressed concern 
that the majority’s holding could “thwart the goal of the 
legislation” since the Legislature’s goal was to remediate the land 
to the extent necessary “to protect the health, safety and welfare of 
the public.”116 
Justice Guidry argued that the only time a plaintiff can recover 
in excess of the most feasible plan amount is when an express 
contractual provision providing for remediation exists.117 
Otherwise, all remediation damages, regardless of whether the 
fact-finder’s amount is greater than the most feasible plan’s 
amount, should be deposited into the registry of the court under the 
statute.118 If there is any leftover money, that amount should be 
returned to the depositor.119 
                                                                                                             
 111. This presupposes that the trial court’s finding of remediation damages 
was not broken down into two different categories (i.e., remediation damages 
based on regulatory standards and remediation damages beyond regulatory 
standards). The court in Savoie v. Richard improperly distinguished between 
such remediation damages. See generally Savoie, 137 So. 3d at 78; see also 
supra note 107. 
 112. See Louisiana Land, 110 So. 3d at 1054. 
 113. Id. at 105859. 
 114. Id. at 1059 (Guidry, J., concurring).  
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 1060. 
 118. Id.  
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D. The Dissent 
Justice Victory wrote a passionate dissent, going further than 
Justice Guidry who merely questioned the issue of excess damages 
by asserting that the clear language of section 30:29 does not allow 
excess damages absent an express contractual provision.120 Justice 
Victory argued that there are only two exceptions to the rule that 
all remediation damages must be paid into the registry of the 
court.121 The first exception is “for private claims suffered as a 
result of environmental damage,” and the second is for claims 
involving an express contractual provision.122 Whereas the 
majority believed that private claims include excess remediation 
damages, Justice Victory asserted that excess remediation damages 
are not an exception under section 30:29’s plain language.123 
According to Justice Victory, if the majority’s interpretation were 
true, then:  
[T]here would be no need for the second sentence of La. 
R.S. 30:29(H), which specifically covers claims for damages 
for “additional remediation in excess of the requirements of 
the plan adopted by the court pursuant to this Section,” and 
allows such damages “as may be required with the terms of 
an express contractual provision.”124 
Justice Victory then specifically addressed the majority’s view 
that a lessee is impliedly obligated to restore the land to its pre-
                                                                                                             
 
In my view, there appears to be no distinction between the 
environmental remediation damages to which the plaintiffs are entitled 
under the Civil Code and the Mineral Code, absent an express 
contractual provision for remediation to a different standard, and the 
compensatory award to fund the so-called ‘feasible plan’ for 
remediation of the land envisioned by La. Rev. Stat. 30:29, which was 
enacted to ensure that the environmental damage is remediated to 
applicable regulatory standards so as to protect the health, safety and 
welfare of the public.  
Id. at 1059. 
 119. Id. at 1060 (“Thus, the statute mandates that all payments or damages 
awarded for evaluation or remediation, other than those awarded for additional 
remediation pursuant to an express contractual provision, must be deposited in 
the registry of the court to fund the remediation plan selected by the trial court, 
and the remainder, if any, is to be returned to the depositer.”). 
 120. Id. at 1063 (Victory, J., dissenting). 
 121. Id. at 1064. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(H) (Supp. 2014)). 
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lease condition.125 He found that the statutory language is clear and 
unambiguous and specifically precludes any new cause of action 
founded under implied obligations.126 He asserted that the 
majority’s decision conflicts with section 30:29(H), which 
provides that “[t]his Section shall not be interpreted to create any 
cause of action or to impose additional implied obligations under 
the mineral code or arising out of a mineral lease.”127 According to 
Justice Victory, by allowing one to recover excess damages under 
the theory of implied obligations, “the majority opinion [did] just 
what is prohibited in [30:29(H)], not to mention creating 
substantive rights.”128 
Justice Victory argued that the majority’s opinion cannot be 
reconciled with Marin, where the Court specifically held that 
damages should be evaluated according to regulatory standards 
rather than full remediation.129 He stated that implied obligations 
under the Mineral or Civil Codes are limited to regulatory 
standards as determined under the procedure of section 30:29, and 
thus “the majority’s holding that a landowner is indeed entitled to 
such excess remediation damages in the absence of an express 
contractual provision amounts to the creation of new substantive 
rights.”130 
In conclusion, Louisiana Land resulted in two different 
opinions on the issue of excess damages. The majority position 
held that despite DNR’s determination of the most feasible plan, 
the plaintiffs can be allowed to recover in excess of the plan, 
provided that either an express contractual provision provides as 
such or the lessee acted unreasonably or excessively.131 Both the 
concurrence and the dissent argued for a more limited position, 
suggesting that excess damages should only be available when an 
express contractual provision specifically provides for such.132 
III. ANALYSIS OF STATE V. LOUISIANA LAND & EXPLORATION CO. AND 
SECTION 30:29 
It is well established that a statute that is clear, unambiguous, 
and does not lead to absurd results should be interpreted as written, 
                                                                                                             
 125. Id. at 1064–65 (Victory, J., dissenting). 
 126. Id. at 1064. 
 127. Id. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(H) (Supp. 2014). 
 128. See Louisiana Land, 110 So. 3d at 1064 (Victory, J., dissenting). 
 129. Id. at 1065. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See id. at 1054 (majority opinion). 
 132. Id. at 1060 (Guidry, J., concurring); id. at 1064 (Victory, J., dissenting). 
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without any further effort to determine the Legislature’s intent.133 
Both the majority and dissent in Louisiana Land claimed that the 
language of section 30:29 was, in fact, clear and unambiguous.134 
However, although the majority found that the clear language of 
the statute permits the recovery of excess remediation damages 
under the theory of implied obligations, the dissent claimed that 
the clear language of the statute prohibits precisely such a 
recovery.135 When members of Louisiana’s highest court disagree 
over the language of a statute, the language is likely neither clear 
nor unambiguous. 
A. Subsections D and H 
The ambiguity of the statute lies in the textual conflict between 
sections 30:29(D) and 30:29(H). Section 30:29(D) states that 
“except as provided in Subsection H of this Section, all damages or 
payments in any civil action . . . awarded for the evaluation or 
remediation of environmental damage shall be paid exclusively into 
the registry of the court . . . .”136 Section 30:29(H) then provides that 
the statute does not prevent a plaintiff from receiving an award for 
private claims due to environmental damage, “[n]or shall it preclude 
a judgment ordering damages for or implementation of additional 
remediation in excess of the requirements of the plan . . . as may be 
required in accordance with the terms of an express contractual 
                                                                                                             
 133. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 9 (2012) (“When a law is clear and unambiguous 
and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be 
applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the 
intent of the legislature.”); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1:4 (2003) (“When 
the wording of a Section is clear and free of ambiguity, the letter of it shall not 
be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”). 
 134. See Louisiana Land, 110 So. 3d at 1049. The majority stated that it 
“agree[s] with the court of appeal [that] the language of Act 312 is clear and 
unambiguous.” Id. The dissent remarked that “when the words of a statute are 
clear and unambiguous, and the application of the law does not lead to absurd 
consequences, the statute should be applied as written and no further effort 
should be made to determine the legislature’s intent.” Id. at 1063 (Victory, J., 
dissenting). Justice Victory then claimed that the “court of appeal and the 
majority opinion ignored these basic rules in their interpretation of La. R.S. 
30:29.” Id. 
 135. See id. at 1054 (majority opinion) (discussing that the statute does not 
affect any claim arising out of a Mineral Code or Civil Code implied 
obligation); id. at 1065 (Victory, J., dissenting) (remarking that “there are no 
implied obligations” in this case “to provide anything more than a regulatory 
remediation in compliance with La. R.S. 30:29”).  
 136. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(D)(1) (Supp. 2014) (emphasis added). For 
the full text of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:29(D)(1), see supra note 
59. 
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provision.”137 The statute further states that it is not intended to 
“impose additional implied obligations.”138 Thus, the statute 
requires that all remediation damages be deposited into the registry 
of the court, except when the lease has a specific contractual 
provision that results in higher damages than DNR’s determination 
as to statutory damages.139 The statute also provides that damages 
awarded from private claims are exempt from the deposit 
requirement.140 
The fact that the statute recognizes that remediation damages 
may be awarded in excess of those found under the statute when 
there is an express contractual provision might indicate a contrario 
that excess damages cannot be awarded unless an express 
contractual provision provides otherwise.141 Making a strict textual 
argument, “private claims” do not include those that may result in 
an award for remediation damages since the statute only explicitly 
identifies one exception in which remediation damages need not be 
deposited into the registry of the court.142 Thus, the “private 
claims” contemplated under the statute could arguably be those 
that result in damages for emotional and mental distress, 
negligence, etc.—not remediation damages. 
B. A Lessee’s Implied Obligation 
However, the majority did not take a literal contextual 
approach and instead looked at whether the statute interfered with 
the substantive rights of the landowner. The majority held that 
“this procedural statute does nothing to the substantive rights of the 
landowner” arising out of the implied obligations found under the 
Civil Code and Mineral Code.143 In contrast with the dissent, the 
majority found that the “private claims” language in the statute 
includes claims asserted under the theory of implied obligations, 
                                                                                                             
 137. LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 30:29(H) (Supp. 2014) (emphasis added). For the 
full text of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:29(H), see supra note 109.  
 138. LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 30:29(H) (Supp. 2014). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See State v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 110 So. 3d 1038, 1064 (La. 
2013) (Victory, J., dissenting) (“Both the court of appeal and majority opinion 
conclude that these ‘private claims’ include claims for excess remediation 
damages. However, if this were true, there would be no need for the second 
sentence of La. R.S. 30:29(H), which specifically covers claims for damages for 
‘additional remediation . . . as may be required in accordance with the terms of 
an express contractual provision.’” (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(H) 
(Supp. 2014))). 
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. at 1054 (majority opinion). 
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which can result in remediation damages.144 Thus, the difference 
between the majority and dissent’s interpretations of the statute 
rests on their respective understandings of the term “implied 
obligation” and whether it qualifies as a private claim.145 Both 
sides agreed that a lessee has the implied obligation to restore the 
property to its pre-leased condition, minus normal wear and tear.146 
What both sides failed to do, however, was deliver a thorough 
explanation of how to determine normal wear and tear. 
The dissent asserted that DNR’s most feasible plan takes into 
account normal wear and tear; accordingly, permitting a plaintiff to 
recover in excess of the most feasible plan under an implied 
obligation theory creates new substantive rights.147 The creation of 
new rights is expressly prohibited under the terms of the statute, 
which states that the statute “shall not be interpreted to create any 
cause of action or to impose additional implied obligations under 
the mineral code or arising out of a mineral lease.”148 On the other 
hand, the majority was not convinced that DNR’s regulatory 
standard based plan—i.e., the most feasible plan—necessarily 
fulfilled this implied obligation to restore the property to pre-
leased condition absent normal wear and tear.149 Although not 
explicitly stated, it can be inferred that the majority did not view 
the implied obligation to restore the property as an additional 
obligation, which would be barred by the statute, but rather as a 
pre-existing one created at the time of the lease.150 
Past jurisprudence reveals that damages contemplated by 
section 30:29 account for normal wear and tear.151 In other words, 
                                                                                                             
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 1054 (majority opinion), 1064 (Victory, J., dissenting). 
 146. Id. at 1046 (majority opinion), 1064 (Victory, J., dissenting). 
 147. Id. at 1064. 
 148. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(H) (Supp. 2014) (“Nor shall it preclude a 
judgment ordering damages for or implementation of additional remediation in 
excess of the requirements of the plan adopted by the court pursuant to this 
Section as may be required in accordance with the terms of an express 
contractual provision.”). 
 149. See Louisiana Land, 110 So. 3d at 1054 (majority opinion). 
 150. Although the majority does not explicitly state that the implied 
obligation to restore the land is a pre-existing rather than an additional 
obligation, it can be inferred that the majority interpreted it as such. Otherwise, 
if the implied obligation to restore was an additional obligation, then this would 
run afoul of the statute: “This Section shall not be interpreted to create any cause 
of action or to impose additional implied obligations under the mineral code or 
arising out of a mineral lease.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(H) (Supp. 2014). 
 151. See Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234, 259 (La. 2010) (“Both 
lower courts essentially held that even where unreasonable or excess use are 
proven, courts must still take into account normal wear and tear in calculating 
the appropriate cost for remediation, and that remediation to 29B standards 
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the most feasible plan should not include damages to restore the 
land to pristine condition; it is okay that the land be restored to its 
original condition, minus normal wear and tear. Thus, in this 
regard, Justice Victory is justified in his dissent. However, he 
incorrectly asserts that the majority’s position amounts to the 
creation of new substantive rights.152 Determining what constitutes 
normal wear and tear depends on the nature and terms of the 
lease.153 Evaluating normal wear and tear is thus a factual 
question—one to be determined by the fact-finder. It is easy to 
envision that DNR’s determination of wear and tear, based on 
regulatory standards, might be different than that of a fact-
finder’s.154 Both DNR and the trial court consider the same facts, 
but regulatory standards “are more tolerant of contamination and 
require less remediation than most lease contracts.”155 Thus, 
DNR’s determination of damages could be different than the 
damages determined by a fact-finder based on an implied 
obligation theory. Such a result does not indicate a creation of new 
substantive rights; it is simply a different calculation of normal 
wear and tear. 
The correct interpretation of the statute does not outright 
prohibit a recovery in excess of DNR’s most feasible plan.156 
                                                                                                             
 
would account for normal wear and tear.”). “The lower courts both correctly 
recognized this point and held that remediation to 29B standards satisfied the 
Castex requirements.” Id. at 260. The requirements command the lessee “to 
correct the damage due to the unreasonable or excessive operations.” Id. 
 152. See Louisiana Land, 110 So. 3d at 1065 (Victory, J., dissenting). 
 153. The Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized that normal wear and tear 
can differ case by case. See Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Castex, 893 So. 2d 
789, 800 (La. 2005). In determining wear and tear, “it is useful to consider the 
character of the specific rights granted in the lease.” Id. 
 154. Indeed, in Savoie v. Richard, the jury determined that total remediation 
warranted damages of $52 million, while DNR found that damages based on 
regulatory standards would only cost $4 million. See Savoie v. Richard, 137 So. 
3d 78, 81 (La. Ct. App. 2014).  
 155. Veron, supra note 27, at 1011. 
 156. The Third Circuit in Savoie v. Richard, the first court (and the only 
Louisiana court as of this Note’s publication) to discuss State v. Louisiana Land 
& Exploration Co. in great depth, supports this assertion. See generally Savoie, 
137 So. 3d at 78. The court ultimately held that the excess should go into the 
registry of the court rather than into the hands of the plaintiffs. Id. at 90. At the 
first stage of proceedings, the jury awarded the plaintiffs $34 million for 
restoration of the property to state regulatory standards and $18 million for 
remediation of property beyond regulatory standards. Id. at 81. Pursuant to 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:29, DNR then adopted a remediation plan 
to regulatory standards. Id. DNR’s most feasible plan found that only $4 million 
was needed to remediate to regulatory standards. Id. Thus, the difference 
between the jury’s and DNR’s amount of damages needed to restore the 
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Instead of asserting that a plaintiff is not entitled to recover in 
excess of DNR’s most feasible plan, the dissent should have 
argued that a plaintiff is not entitled to recover in excess of those 
damages found under the theory of implied obligations. Discerning 
what damages are allowable under implied obligations necessarily 
means determining normal wear and tear, which is a factual 
question to be determined by the fact-finder. 
C. The Legislature’s Intent: Balancing Public Policy Issues 
The Civil Code requires that when the language of a law is 
unclear and ambiguous, or is “susceptible of different meanings, it 
must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the 
purpose of the law.”157 Thus, the true interpretation of the statute lies 
within the Legislature’s intent. Passed in response to the potential 
windfall for plaintiffs, the statute intended to control damages to the 
“extent necessary to protect the public interest.”158 Section 30:29 
states that “the natural resources and the environment of the state, 
including ground water, are to be protected, conserved, and 
replenished insofar as possible and consistent with the health, safety, 
and welfare of the people.”159 The statute is not intended to limit a 
                                                                                                             
 
property to regulatory standards was about $30 million. When DNR’s plan was 
submitted to the trial court for approval, the plaintiffs failed to contest the $4 
million plan. Id. The Third Circuit remarked that “[s]ince the Savoies [plaintiffs] 
waived that right completely of their own volition, the trial court had no choice 
but to adopted the DNR’s plan as submitted.” Id. at 86. Although the trial court 
effectively had no choice but to adopt DNR’s plan as the most feasible plan, the 
trial court judge still entered final judgment of $34 million, pursuant to the 
jury’s findings, giving the $30 million difference to the Savoies personally. Id. 
at 87. On appeal, the Third Circuit held that the Savoies were not entitled to the 
$30 million difference: “landowners are not to recover any award made 
specifically for remediation to state standards, i.e., that amount required to 
return the land to a state that suits the public interest.” Id. Thus, the Third Circuit 
stated that the Savoies were not entitled to the $30 million difference, as any 
amount awarded to remediate up to regulatory standards falls under the purview 
of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:29. Id. However, the appellate court 
did not disturb the jury’s award of $18 million to restore beyond regulatory 
standards, which was awarded directly to the plaintiffs rather than into the 
registry of the court. Id. at 90. It is this “excess” that is given to the plaintiffs—
the difference between remediation to regulatory standards and remediation to a 
higher standard.  
 157. LA. CIV. CODE art. 10 (2012). 
 158. Pitre, Six Years Later, supra note 1, at 94.  
 159. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(A) (Supp. 2014). The full text of this 
Section states: 
The legislature hereby finds and declares that Article IX, Section 1 of the 
Constitution of Louisiana mandates that the natural resources and the 
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plaintiff’s judgment but rather to ensure that the part of the 
judgment necessary to protect the public interest—remediation 
damages determined by DNR under regulatory standards as the 
most feasible plan—is distributed through the court.160 In sum, 
environmental concerns formed the basis of this statute’s purpose, 
not economic concerns. 
Since the intent of the Legislature was to protect the public 
welfare and that goal can be accomplished regardless of whether a 
plaintiff receives damages in excess of the amount required by the 
statute, the majority’s interpretation of the statute is most 
consistent with the Legislature’s intent. Based on the plain 
language of the statute, it is clear that the Legislature did not intend 
to interfere with any damages other than those necessary to bring 
the land up to regulatory standards.161 Therefore, a landowner’s 
right to recover damages should not be limited by the statute; the 
statute should only require that the amount of remediation 
necessary to fund the plan, as determined by the court, be filtered 
through the court. Additionally, if a trial court awards remediation 
damages beyond regulatory standards, then the plaintiff should 
receive the excess amount.162 
In addition to the majority’s position being consistent with the 
true purpose of the law, the majority opinion is also consistent with 
past jurisprudence. The majority reaffirmed the procedural nature 
                                                                                                             
 
environment of the state, including ground water, are to be protected, 
conserved, and replenished insofar as possible and consistent with the 
health, safety, and welfare of the people and further mandates that the 
legislature enact laws to implement this policy. It is the duty of the 
legislature to set forth procedures to ensure that damage to the 
environment is remediated to a standard that protects the public 
interest. To this end, this Section provides the procedure for judicial 
resolution of claims for environmental damage to property arising from 
activities subject to the jurisdiction of the Department of Natural 
Resources, office of conservation. The provisions of this Section shall 
be implemented upon receipt of timely notice as required by Paragraph 
(B)(1) of this Section. The provisions of this Section shall not be 
construed to impede or limit provisions under private contracts 
imposing remediation obligations in excess of the requirements of the 
department or limit the right of a party to a private contract to enforce 
any contract provision in a court of proper jurisdiction. 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(A) (Supp. 2014). 
 160. See id. § 30:29(A), (D)(1). 
 161. Id. § 30:29(C)(3)(a) (“The department shall use and apply the 
applicable regulatory standards in approving or structuring a plan that the 
department determines to be the most feasible plan to evaluate or remediate the 
environmental damage.” (emphasis added)).  
 162. See Savoie v. Richard, 137 So. 3d 78, 90 (La. Ct. App. 2014).  
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of section 30:29,163 as the Louisiana Supreme Court did in M.J. 
Farms.164 Consistent with Castex Energy, a lessee still must act 
unreasonably or excessively in order for the plaintiff to be eligible 
for remediation damages in the absence of an express contractual 
provision providing for remediation.165 The majority recognized 
that additional steps are required when a lessee acts unreasonably 
or excessively, and determining those steps depends on the nature 
of the lease.166 In some cases—like Marin in 2010—those 
additional steps may be the statutorily required regulatory standard 
under section 30:29 rather than remediation determined under a 
different standard.167 However, the majority left open the 
possibility that the additional steps might be greater than the 
DNR’s determination of remediation costs. 
IV. RECOMMENDATION: REVISE LOUISIANA REVISED STATUTES 
SECTION 30:29 
There is a need in Louisiana to guarantee that the state’s 
environment is protected and that landowners are sufficiently 
compensated. Well-written legislation has the ability to fill this 
need; however, the current state of section 30:29 falls short. Given 
that section 30:29 was drafted ambiguously and members of the 
Louisiana Supreme Court have opposing interpretations of its 
meaning, the best solution is to amend the current law and provide 
much needed clarity concerning awards for remediation.168 Such a 
revision would more accurately reflect the Legislature’s intent, 
standardize courts’ interpretations of section 30:29, and prevent 
windfalls. 
Since the statute is merely procedural and no further 
environmental goal is accomplished by prohibiting a claim under 
the theory of implied obligations, the language of the statute 
should expressly state that the statute’s procedure does not affect a 
landowner recovering in excess of DNR’s damages based on any 
private claim, including under the lessee’s implied obligation to 
restore the land. Additionally, this option gives the fact-finder its 
rightful chance to evaluate wear and tear. 
                                                                                                             
 163. See State v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 110 So. 3d 1038, 1053 (La. 
2013). 
 164. See M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 998 So. 2d 16, 40 (La. 
2008) (Johnson, J., concurring). 
 165. See Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Castex Energy, Inc., 893 So. 2d 789, 
801 (La. 2005); Louisiana Land, 110 So. 3d at 1057–58.  
 166. Louisiana Land, 110 So. 3d at 1057–58. 
 167. See Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234, 260 (La. 2010). 
 168. See supra Parts II.B, D. 
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Only two sections need to be amended: sections 30:29(D) and 
30:29(H). The interplay between these two sections was directly 
responsible for the outcome in Louisiana Land and also 
represented a strong point of contention between the majority and 
the dissent.169 Section 30:29(D)(1), with the proposed changes 
underlined, should read as follows: 
Whether or not the department or the attorney general 
intervenes, and except as provided in Subsection H of this 
Section, all damages or payments in any civil action as 
determined under this Section to fund the statutorily 
required most feasible plan, including interest thereon, 
awarded for the evaluation or remediation of environmental 
damage shall be paid exclusively into the registry of the 
court in an interest-bearing account with the interest 
accruing to the account for clean up.170 
Additionally, section 30:29(H), with the proposed changes 
underlined and struck through, should be amended to read as 
follows:  
This Section shall not preclude an owner of land from 
pursuing a judicial remedy or receiving a judicial award for 
private claims suffered as a result of environmental 
damage, except as otherwise provided in this Section. Such 
private claims may include those asserted under an implied 
obligation. Nor shall it preclude a judgment ordering 
damages for or implementation of additional remediation in 
excess of the requirements of the plan adopted by the court 
pursuant to this Section as may be required in accordance 
with the terms of an express contractual provision or by any 
other private claim. Any award granted in connection with 
the judgment for additional remediation is not required to 
be paid into the registry of the court. This Section shall not 
be interpreted to create any cause of action or to impose 
additional implied obligations under the mineral code or 
arising out of a mineral lease.171 
An amendment incorporating these simple changes would 
clarify the statute and eliminate the contrary interpretations between 
the majority and the dissent. The change in section 30:29(D) 
clarifies that when a fact-finder’s determination of damages is 
different than DNR’s determination, the only damages that must be 
                                                                                                             
 169. See generally Louisiana Land, 110 So. 3d at 1038; see supra Part II. 
 170. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(D)(1) (Supp. 2014). 
 171. Id. § 30:29(H). 
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deposited into the registry of the court are those determined by 
DNR. The plaintiff is entitled to directly receive the rest. The 
changes in section 30:29(H) support the majority’s holding in 
Louisiana Land in permitting a plaintiff to receive excess damages 
based on an implied obligation. Additionally, these changes do not 
interrupt prior jurisprudence; they simply reaffirm the rule of 
Louisiana Land that excess remediation damages can be recovered 
in the absence of an express contractual provision. Finally, revising 
the statute accomplishes two very important goals: (1) the revision 
renders the statute clear and unambiguous, in contrast to its prior 
version; and (2) the revision provides courts with a mechanism to 
ensure that plaintiffs will remediate their land to the extent 
necessary to protect the environment. 
CONCLUSION 
The Legislature first attempted to reconcile the competing public 
interests of holding oil companies accountable for environmental 
damage while preventing plaintiffs from receiving windfalls in 2006 
by enacting Act 312, now Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
30:29.172 Despite the Legislature’s efforts to clarify legacy litigation, 
the statute falls short. Since its passage, courts have struggled with 
how to interpret the statute.173 The Louisiana Supreme Court’s 
latest conflicting interpretations in Louisiana Land reveal the need 
for the Legislature to step in once again.174  
The Legislature’s intent in passing the statute was centered on 
protecting Louisiana’s environment.175 Thus, any revision to 
section 30:29 should further this intent. Limiting a plaintiff’s 
remediation damages to those found under section 30:29, as 
suggested by the dissent in Louisiana Land, does not further any 
environmental purpose.176 In fact, limiting a plaintiff’s damages 
could actually have a negative environmental effect. The less 
damages a plaintiff receives, the less money that can be used to 
remediate the land. In actuality, such a limitation disturbs the fact-
finder’s responsibility in evaluating normal wear and tear.177 
On the other hand, permitting a plaintiff to recover in excess of 
the remediation damages found under section 30:29 does not disturb 
                                                                                                             
 172. See generally id. § 30:29. 
 173. See discussion supra Parts I–II. 
 174. See discussion supra Part II.  
 175. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(A) (Supp. 2014) . 
 176. State v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 110 So. 3d 1038, 1063 (La. 2013) 
(Victory, J., dissenting).  
 177. See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
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the fact-finder’s duty.178 The trier of fact can still evaluate wear and 
tear and thereby come to the conclusion that the plaintiff’s 
remediation damages are greater than those determined by DNR 
under the statute.179 By revising the statute to explicitly make clear 
that a plaintiff can recover excess remediation damages under any 
private claim, including implied obligations, the statute’s public 
policies are preserved. The environment will still be protected in 
legacy litigation cases and plaintiff-landowners’ substantive rights 
will not be jeopardized.180 Ultimately, this proposed revision 
serves to protect the public from environmental damage by holding 
oil and gas exploration and production companies accountable for 
their actions, while also ensuring that plaintiff-landowners do, in 
fact, remediate their land. 
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 178. See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
 179. See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
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